Introduction
In understanding the behavior of the macro economy, it is critical to understand the channels through which monetary policy operates. To what extent does the rise in interest rates impact the lending of U.S. banks? Does the strength of this lending effect depend on economic growth? In this paper, we address these questions in detail. Our findings may provide useful insights into the strength of the bank credit channel in the coming years.
To address the above questions, we simultaneously investigate (1) if the bank credit channel was operational in U.S. banks' domestic lending during the period from 1986 to 2008, and (2) whether economic activity affects the strength of the bank credit channel of monetary policy.
Regarding (1), we document that the bank lending channel, identified by Kashyap and Stein (2000) in the total and C&I lending of smaller banks from 1976 to 1993, was also present in other major lending categories. In addition, we find that the bank balance sheet channel of monetary policy operated not only through small banks, but also through US banks with the largest market shares in lending, which highlights the economic importance of this transmission mechanism.
Regarding (2), the main contribution of our paper is that we shed light on how economic activity affects the strength of the bank credit channel of monetary policy. What would such an effect look like? As the value of bank assets is more pro-cyclical than the value of liabilities, bank net worth is pro-cyclical. As a result, the external finance premium that "riskier" banks face during a monetary policy tightening is counter-cyclical. Therefore, we expect the bank credit channel to be stronger during times of weak economic growth. Indeed, our analysis finds that the underlying transmission mechanism of monetary policy is stronger when output growth is low, suggesting that the bank credit channel of monetary policy is a more potent tool when economic conditions are weak. Moreover, our results suggest that for some of the major lending categories, the bank credit channel is operative almost exclusively in a low-growth environment. Interestingly, we do not find evidence of the relevance of the bank credit channel and the effect of economic activity on its strength in the post-2007 period, suggesting an important post-financial crisis change in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy through bank lending in the United States.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the remainder of this section, we develop our hypotheses and results in the context of the related literature. In Section 2 we describe our bank-level data and controls. We present our estimation methodology in Section 3, and we discuss the empirical results in Section 4. In Section 5 we show additional specifications and conduct robustness tests, and we conclude in Section 6.
Hypothesis development and literature review
One of our main findings is that the bank credit channel worked actively through U.S. banks' domestic lending from 1986 to 2008 -i.e., that a tightening in U.S. monetary policy reduced the lending of U.S. commercial banks, and monetary policy easing expanded such lending. The result derives from two simultaneous mechanisms. First, a tightening in monetary policy reduces the availability of funding to banks (Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Kishan and Opiela, 2000, 2006) , causing (smaller) banks with less balance sheet liquidity to cut their lending -i.e., the bank lending channel of monetary policy (Kashyap and Stein, 1995) . Second, the monetary effects on lending act through the net worth of banks, the bank balance sheet channel -i.e., because less capitalized banks (which investors judge to be riskier) find it increasingly expensive to replenish their liabilities in a higher interest rate environment, and thus reduce their lending.
The extensive literature on the bank credit channel dates back to Bernanke and Gertler (1995) , who argued that changes in monetary policy impact the real economy in part by affecting banks' lending decisions. Kashyap and Stein (2000) established empirically the existence of the bank lending channel in the U.S. -one of the mechanisms through which the credit channel operates: a tightening in monetary policy makes reservable liabilities less available to banks, and hence reduces banks' lending. Kashyap and Stein (2000) also showed that this bank lending channel is the strongest amongst those banks with the most limited access to non-reservable liabilities such as wholesale funding: smaller banks, and among those, banks with less balance sheet liquidity (proxied with low securities to assets ratios).
In our analysis, we extend the period of the Kashyap and Stein (2000) study up to the global financial crisis and we show that the bank lending channel they identified continued to hold in the lending of smaller U.S. banks. 4 This finding is consistent with other studies in the bank lending channel literature. For instance, Altunbas et al (2009) showed that access to securitization is negatively related to the strength of the bank lending channel. Motivated by den Haan et al (2007) , who find differences in the strength of the bank lending channel across target sectors, we study C&I, residential real estate (RRE) and consumer lending in addition to total lending flows. We find that the lending channel operates through smaller U.S. banks' RRE and consumer lending, even more strongly than via C&I lending. 5 4 Smaller U.S. banks are those below the 95 th percentile of the cross-sectional distribution of asset size in each period. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012) also extended the analysis through the 2000s and found evidence of the continued existence of the bank lending channel, using an alternative measure of balance sheet liquidity: the liquid assets ratio. 5 In recent years, several new papers have studied the bank credit channel in a non-US context. Some papers focused on the strength of domestic monetary transmission in a foreign country (Jimenez et al, 2012; Ioannidou et al, 2015) while others examined the strength of the credit channel in an international context (Correa et al, 2015; Correa et al, 2017; Temesvary et al, 2018 , among others).
The second mechanism underlying the bank credit channel is the bank balance sheet channel: following a tightening in monetary policy, investors judge financially "weaker", less capitalized (lower net worth), banks to be riskier (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999; Halvorsen and Jacobsen, 2016) . As a result, such banks face a relatively larger increase in funding costs in funding markets (the external finance premium), which limits their lending. Temesvary et al (2018) show evidence of the bank balance sheet channel for total lending in the U.S. domestic context and in U.S. banks' cross-border lending, as do Correa et al (2017) . 6 We document the presence of the bank balance sheet channel of monetary policy for total, C&I, residential and consumer lending of smaller U.S. banks from 1986 to 2008. We find strong evidence that the lending of smaller U.S. banks with lower equity capital ratios (net worth) is significantly more affected by changes in U.S. monetary policy than the lending of better capitalized U.S. banks (Kishan and Opiela, 2000) . In addition, we extend the study of the bank credit channel for lending by all U.S. banks, including larger banks, in contrast to most of the literature on monetary policy transmission via bank lending, which focuses on smaller banks.
Weighing each observation by the lending bank's market share in each market segment, we find strong evidence that the bank balance sheet channel indeed affects the lending of all U.S. banks, even when we account for banks' market shares. This finding is policy relevant, as it provides evidence of the bank credit channel in the lending of the economically most significant banks with the highest market shares. 6 A key challenge in identifying both mechanisms of the bank credit channel is to disentangle the effect of monetary policy on credit supply from its effects on credit demand (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992) . Kashyap and Stein (2000) address this issue by including controls for macroeconomic developments, while comparing the impact of monetary policy on the lending of smaller banks with lower vs. higher securities ratios. Temesvary et al (2018) use extensive sets of fixed effects in their analysis of the bank credit channel in U.S. banks' domestic and cross-border lending to fully control for time-varying shocks to the demand for bank credit -while comparing the impact of monetary policy changes on the lending of more vs. less funding-constrained U.S. banks as Kashyap and Stein (2000) -. Together with studying the credit channel in U.S. banks' domestic lending, our main research question focuses on: to what extent does the strength of this credit channel depend on aggregate, non-bank specific, factors -namely, economic activity? While earlier papers with micro data have investigated the role of various bank-specific variables, only a few studies have looked at the cyclicality in the transmission of monetary policy. 7 Aikman et al (2017) study how the "credit cycle" affects the impact of monetary policy on real economic activity, and find that monetary policy is more potent when credit conditions are tighter.
We investigate (to our knowledge, for the first time in the literature) how cyclicality in economic activity affects the relationship between monetary policy and credit conditions, i.e., the strength of the bank credit channel. The works of Bernanke et al (1999) and Matsuyama (2007) suggest that since bank net worth is pro-cyclical, the external finance premium that "riskier" banks face during a period of monetary policy tightening is counter-cyclical. Therefore, we expect the bank credit channel to be more potent during times of weak economic growth. Indeed, we show that the strength of the bank credit channel is significantly stronger both statistically and economically when the growth rate of real GDP is lower, and that the difference in the effectiveness of the channel is present even in the (market share-weighted) lending of all U.S. commercial banks; that is, we find the effect also for large banks.
Finally, we do not find strong evidence of the bank credit channel for the period after 2007, which is consistent with previous work suggesting that there has been a regime shift in the domestic 7 Kashyap and Stein (2000) examine the role of bank size, and find that the lending channel is the strongest for smaller U.S. banks, which are more limited in their ability to obtain external funding. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012) study whether "globally active" U.S. banks respond differently to changes in U.S. monetary policy. They find that "globalness" insulates U.S. banks from monetary policy, as they draw on the liquidity of foreign affiliates as a buffer.
transmission mechanism of US monetary policy through bank lending since the financial crisis (Civelli et al, 2018) .
Data description

Lending flows and balance sheet controls
We use bank-level data on U.S. commercial banks from a merger-adjusted version of the publicly available Call Reports (Reports of Conditions and Income). Our dataset contains detailed balance sheet information for all U.S. commercial banks, with quarterly frequency between 1986 and 2008.
Our dependent variables, i.e., our measures of lending, are total, C&I, residential, and consumer lending flows. As is standard in the related literature, for each market segment we define lending flows as the quarterly change in the natural logarithm of each bank's stock of loans, multiplied by 100. Our main explanatory variables of interest are measures of how sensitive is a bank to changes in monetary policy. First, we use the securities to assets ratio (in accordance with the definition in Kashyap and Stein, 2000) as a proxy of "funding constraint" in our study of the bank lending channel. Second, we employ the equity capital ratio (as in Temesvary et al, 2018) to proxy banks' "funding constraint" when we study the bank balance sheet channel.
We also control for the effects of changes in banks' balance sheet conditions on credit supply that are unrelated to changes in monetary policy. We do so by using a set of balance sheet controls that include real net income, return on assets, level and growth of real total assets, and the deposits to assets ratio (which proxies for a bank's access to short-term liquid liabilities). We provide detailed definitions of the dependent and control variables, as well as summary statistics, in Table 1 . We also include bank and, when possible, time (year:quarter)-specific fixed effects.
These fixed effects capture unobservable shocks to the demand and supply of credit that are specific to individual banks but invariant over time (such as banks' business model), and which vary over time but affect banks similarly (such as macroeconomic developments).
Monetary policy and real economic activity measures
The main macroeconomic variables of interest are our measure of changes in U. 
Controls for changes in credit demand
As discussed above, an important task we face is to control for macroeconomic changes that may affect banking clients' demand for credit in the United States. It is important to control for these effects, which are otherwise unobservable, to ensure our identification of the relationship between changes in U.S. monetary policy and banks' credit supply decisions. We include several Macro Controls to address this issue: the unemployment rate, a recession dummy, quarterly inflation and real aggregate investment. In addition, as Demand Controls we include weighted aggregated controls for credit demand and standards from banks' responses to the quarterly Senior Loan
Officer Opinion Surveys (SLOOS). In some specifications, we also replace such macro-level controls with time fixed effects to capture those time-varying macro-level shocks that are common across all commercial banks in our sample. These fixed effects also control for non-monetary policy related factors such as regulations, which might affect banks' lending (Frame et al, 2018) .
Estimation methodology
We employ a continuous diff-in-diff estimation method to identify the bank lending and bank balance sheet channels of monetary policy, which has become standard in the related literature (see Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012 ; among others). We take important steps beyond the estimation methodology of these earlier papers, however, by (1) examining the bank credit channel's interaction with economic activity, and (2) including fixed effects and extensive sets of controls (as described in the previous section) to eliminate non-monetary policy related confounding effects on lending flows.
Our main specification describes U.S. banks' quarterly lending flows as follows. Let , denote bank j's holdings of loans of type n (where n is one of total, C&I, CRE, RRE, and consumer) at time t. Then ln( ) , captures the quarterly change (from time t-1 to time t) of the natural logarithm of bank j's stock of loans of type n. Our specification is as follows: In Equation (1), ln( ) , denotes the quarter-to-quarter lending flow at the bank level as described above. The monetary policy variable MP is the quarterly change in the fed funds rate from time t-1 to t. Furthermore, C denotes the bank's securities to assets ratio, later replaced by the equity capital to assets ratio. 8 As in Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012), we focus on the cumulative impact of monetary policy changes over the four preceding quarters. 9 Therefore, we include four lags of the monetary policy measure, the funding constraint proxy, and their interactions. 10 Furthermore, is the quarterly change (from t-1 to t) in the U.S. real gross domestic product, as described above. The sets of Bank Controls and Demand Controls contains the variables described in the previous section. In addition, these vectors also include combinations of bank and time fixed effects to control for unobservable time-invariant bank-specific, and bank-invariant time-varying shocks, respectively, which impact lending flows.
Our strategy for identifying the bank credit channel of U.S. monetary policy focuses on the sign of the cumulative coefficients on the interaction term of the bank's funding ratio and the U.S.
8 A potential concern is the feedback effect that may exist from domestic economic conditions to monetary policy changes. Given our identification strategy we are less concerned about domestic macroeconomic feedback effects into monetary policy (Acharya et al, 2016) . Indeed, we identify monetary transmission from the differential response of funding-constrained vs. funding-abundant banks. Even if macro shocks simultaneously affect all banks' flows through monetary policy, the cross-bank differences in the strength of transmission should not be impacted. 9 Our use of lagged values of the bank funding ratios ensures that these ratios may at most reflect past strategic choices of banks. The inclusion of four lags of the quarterly interest rate changes (as is standard in the related literature) ensures that we capture the cumulative effect of monetary policy changes throughout the previous year. 10 Since a bank can choose its funding ratio strategically, the inclusion of lags of the funding ratio that are in time similar to those of the monetary policy changes (in their levels and interactions) reduces concerns that the funding ratio may be endogenous to the interest rate changes. 
Estimation results
11 In Equation (1), the operation of the bank credit channel would suggest the direct effect of a tightening in U.S. monetary policy on bank flows to be negative: ∑ =1 4 < 0, but such a result is not needed for our identification scheme. In fact, for C&I lending, den Haan et al (2007) and Civelli et al (2018) document an increase in business loans in response to monetary tightening.
Between the two prongs of the bank credit channel, we first examine the bank lending channel and its interaction with economic activity, as laid out in the Introduction. In Table 2 , we consider smaller US banks' all-encompassing, total core lending.
12 Columns 1 to 4 examine the role of banks' securities holdings in mitigating the impact of monetary policy, as in Kasyhap and Stein (2000) . In these estimations, we interact the bank lending channel strength measures with the U.S.
real GDP growth rate.
We find strong evidence of the existence of the bank lending channel: the cumulative interaction of the securities to assets ratio (SEC) with quarterly changes in the fed funds rate is consistently statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Furthermore, the results also strongly confirm that this monetary transmission effect is particularly potent when economic growth is low:
the coefficients on the double interaction terms are consistently negative and highly statistically significant. These effects are robust to the inclusion of extensive sets of macroeconomic and credit demand controls (Columns 2 and 3) as well as to the most stringent specification with time fixed effects (Column 4). These findings, which are qualitatively consistent across specifications, suggest that in total lending the bank lending channel operates strongly when GDP growth is low, but does not operate when GDP growth is high. Note that in periods of low economic growth, we tend to think of monetary policy as typically easing, not tightening. Thus, the interpretation of our results through this lens is that monetary policy is likely to be more effective through the bank credit channel when it is trying to spur growth during periods of low growth, rather than in trying to cool down the economy in periods of high growth.
We study the strength of the other mechanism of the bank credit channel, the bank balance sheet channel of monetary transmission, in Columns 5 to 8 of Table 2 . To do so, we consider the interaction of changes in monetary policy with each bank's equity capital to assets ratio (CAR).
Therefore, this measure of funding constraint now replaces the SEC ratio, the funding constraint measure we used in Columns 1 to 4. These specifications, which examine the bank balance sheet The results in Columns 5 through 8 confirm the existence of the bank balance sheet channel in U.S. banks' total lending flows -especially in low growth periods. The coefficients on the (simple) the cumulative interaction of the fed funds rate changes and CAR are consistently positive and significant at the 1 percent level. In addition, the double interaction of this term with the GDP growth rate is negative and statistically significant. Calculations based on the coefficients in Column 6 reveal that a 100 bps tightening in the fed funds rate would lower the total lending flows of a bank with median CAR by 0.47 pp during a period of low growth, but the comparable negative effect in a high growth environment would be a lower reduction by 0.34 pp.
As before, the simple interaction term is significantly higher (at 0.09) when evaluated during a period of low growth, than in a high growth period (near zero). The economic effects are significant as well. A 100 bps increase in the fed funds rate would lower the total lending of a low capitalized bank (at the 10 th percentile of the CAR distribution, which corresponds to 7.38 percent)
by 0.51 pp more than the lending of a high capitalized bank (at the 90 th percentile of CAR, which is 13.27 percent), in a low-growth environment. In contrast, when economic growth is high, this differential impact would be substantially smaller, at 0.03 pp.
The results discussed so far have focused on smaller US banks, weighing each bank equally -that is, without taking into account each bank's credit market share. However, in the highly concentrated US banking markets, the behavior of the largest banks can provide important insight about aggregate lending patterns. Thus, next we turn to studying the presence of the bank lending channel and the bank balance sheet channel in the weighted total lending flows of all U.S.
commercial banks. The weighted estimations include all U.S. banks (the largest banks as well as the smaller banks we have studied thus far) and weigh each bank's lending flows by that bank's market share in the given market segment.
As expected based on the hypotheses laid out in the Introduction, we find no evidence of the presence of the bank lending channel in the weighted results (not shown). 13 In contrast, as shown in Columns 9 through 12 of Table 2 , we document the presence of the bank balance sheet channel in the weighted total lending flows regressions. The coefficients on the relevant simple interaction term show that in response to a 100 bps increase in the fed funds rate over four quarters, a 1 pp higher capital ratio would correspond to a 0.73 to 0.78 pp weaker lending decline. The double interaction terms reveal that even a 1 pp increase in the GDP growth rate would attenuate this differential impact by 0.79 to 0.88 pp. These relative magnitudes imply that in the weighted estimations, the bank balance sheet channel of monetary policy transmission is present only when economic growth is very low -notably, below the 25 th percentile of the distribution of economic growth rates over our sample period. For instance, in terms of economic significance, the monetary transmission-mitigating impact of a higher CAR is 0.24 to 0.28 pp when economic growth is very low (at the 10 th percentile, bottom rows of Table 2 ).
Our strong evidence of the bank credit channel for banks' total lending in Table 2 leads us to hone in on each of the economically more relevant core lending categories. We first evaluate the presence of the bank lending channel both in business financing, where we consider C&I and commercial real estate (CRE) lending, and in household financing, where we consider residential real estate (RRE) and consumer lending. Then, we perform a similar set of econometric exercises by lending category to assess the presence of the bank balance sheet channel. Table 3 shows the results for C&I lending flows, estimated from the same specifications that we used for total lending. Columns 1 through 4 evaluate the bank lending channel, and we see that most of the relevant interaction coefficient estimates are larger during periods of low economic activity. For instance, in Column 1 the interaction of cumulative monetary policy changes with the SEC ratio (the simple interaction term) is 0.06 in a low growth environment, but is only 0.03 when economic growth is high. Furthermore, calculations also reveal that in response to a 100 bps tightening in the fed funds rate (over four quarters), the lending of a funding-constrained bank would respond by 2.32 pp more than the lending of a funding-abundant bank -when economic growth is low. In a high-growth environment, this differential is only 1.18 pp. The results of the fourth column, which is our most complete fixed effects specification, suggest that the bank lending channel was operative during our sample period. However, this channel was not significantly stronger in periods of weak output growth, which highlights the importance of other lending categories in driving the differential effectiveness of monetary policy documented for total lending. Columns 5 to 8 provide the results for CRE lending. However, the lack of significance and change in signs of the coefficients of interest across specifications indicate that the bank lending channel did not operate through CRE lending during our sample period.
The lack of significance for CRE lending, the weak result obtained for the fixed effects specification in C&I lending, and the sole focus of earlier work (Kashyap and Stein, 2000, Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012) on total and C&I lending flows, suggest that our disaggregated analysis (evaluating all the major loan type categories separately) can be quite helpful to better explain how the bank lending channel of monetary policy operates in the United States. Therefore, in Table 4 we run the same specifications as in Table 3 , now for lending to households: residential and consumer lending flows. Importantly, we find evidence of the bank lending channel of monetary policy both in residential (Columns 1 through 4) and consumer lending (Columns 5 through 8).
Looking at residential flows first, the simple and double interaction terms are consistently positive and negative, respectively, and significant at the 1 percent level throughout. For instance,
in Column 1, the value of the simple interaction term (the mitigating effect of a higher SEC ratio on the direct impact of monetary policy) is 0.06 when evaluated at low economic growth, but is much smaller near zero, when evaluated in a high growth environment (as show in the calculations at the bottom of the table). Furthermore, this same column also reveals that a 100 bps tightening in the fed funds rate over four quarters would reduce the residential lending of a funding constrained bank by 1.47 pp more than the lending of a more funding abundant bank, in a low economic growth environment. However, this differential effect is substantially lower, at 0.06 pp, in a high growth environment.
Turning to consumer lending in Columns 5 through 8, the magnitudes of the coefficients of interest are somewhat smaller, but the simple and double interaction coefficients are consistently and significantly positive and negative, respectively, as before. As shown for example in Column 5, the simple interaction term is 0.04 in a low growth environment, but infinitesimal in a highgrowth environment. Accordingly, a 100 bps tightening in U.S. monetary policy over four quarters would reduce the consumer lending of a funding-constrained U.S. bank by 1.59 pp more than the consumer lending flows of a funding-abundant bank, in a low-growth environment. This differential effect is smaller, at near 0.41 pp, in a high-growth environment. The results (also in Tables 2 and 3) reveal that banks with higher SEC ratios lend substantially more, all else equal, than their more funding-constrained counterparts.
For each major lending category, we now turn to analyze the strength of the second mechanism of the bank credit channel, the bank balance sheet channel of monetary transmission.
In Table 5 we repeat the specifications in Table 3 , now interacting changes in monetary policy with each bank's capital ratio. As expected, Columns 1 through 4 show that C&I lending by low capitalized banks responds more strongly to changes in U.S. monetary policy, and the differential is larger when economic growth is low. For instance, Column 2 reveals that a 100 bps tightening in the fed funds rate would lower the C&I lending growth of a low capitalized bank 0.63 pp more than that of a high capitalized bank when economic growth is low -but by much less (0.03 pp) when growth is high. Importantly, the specifications for C&I lending throughout Table 5 consistently show that well-capitalized banks maintain significantly higher lending growth than low capitalized ones. 14 In contrast, as shown in Columns 5 to 8, there is neither evidence of higher CRE lending growth for higher capitalized banks, nor evidence supporting the presence of a bank balance sheet channel operating through this lending category during the period.
In Table 6 we repeat the Table 5 specifications, studying the bank balance sheet channel of monetary policy by using the equity capital to assets ratio as a measure of a bank's funding constraint. However, instead of focusing on C&I and CRE, we run the analysis for the major household financing categories, i.e., RRE and consumer lending. We find some evidence that lower capitalized banks' residential lending flows respond stronger to changes in U.S. monetary policy, especially in lower growth periods. The coefficients on the simple and double interaction terms are always positive and negative, respectively, and generally statistically significant, including in the most stringent specification that includes bank and time fixed effects. In Column 2, for instance, the differential response of a low capitalized bank to a 100 bps tightening in the fed funds rate is 0.36 pp greater than that of a low capitalized bank when growth is low, but this differential response is near zero when economic growth is high. There is no evidence of the bank balance sheet channel in consumer lending (Columns 5 through 8 of Table 6 ). However, the result that better capitalized banks lend significantly more, prevails throughout all specifications.
In Tables 7 and 8, share in the given market segment. In Table 7 we study the bank balance sheet channel for business financing, looking at the C&I and CRE lending flows of all U.S. commercial banks. We find significant and large coefficient estimates in our analysis of weighted C&I lending flows (Columns 1 through 4). The simple interaction coefficient estimates range from 1.10 to 1.25 in magnitude, and the double interaction coefficients are in the 1.08 to 1.13 range -all significant at the 1 percent level. The relative magnitudes of these coefficients suggest that, as in the case of total lending flows, the bank balance sheet channel of monetary policy transmission is present in C&I lending flows only in times of low economic growth. Additionally, the strong positive relationship between capitalization and lending growth that we highlighted when discussing non-weighted results, no longer holds in our weighted estimations for either C&I or CRE lending. The CRE lending results, shown in Columns 5 to 8, also suggest that the bank balance sheet channel was not present during our sample period.
In Table 8 , we examine the strength of the bank balance sheet channel in all U.S. banks' weighted residential and consumer lending flows. There is no evidence of the existence of the bank balance sheet channel of monetary policy transmission in residential lending flows (Columns 1 through 4). However, we do find strong and consistent evidence in consumer lending flows (Columns 5 through 8) -where the coefficients on the interaction terms are large and significant at the 1 percent level throughout. The economic significance of these results is notable: for instance, calculations based on the coefficient estimates in Column 7 imply that for a bank with the median capital to assets ratio, a 100 bps increase in the fed funds rate would reduce consumer lending flows by 1.14 pp, at the median economic growth rate. The negative and significant coefficients on the double interaction terms suggest that these negative lending effects are significantly larger in periods of low economic growth. Indeed, a 100bps increase in the fed funds rate lowers the lending growth of a low capitalized bank substantially more than that of a high capitalized bank when economic growth is low -but this differential reverses sign when growth is high, suggesting the lack of a bank balance sheet channel.
Alternative specifications
To alleviate concerns about potential endogeneity of GDP growth to monetary policy actions driving our results, we also repeat our estimations instrumenting actual concurrent GDP growth with one-quarter lagged forecast values. This instrumental variable is yesterday's prediction of today's GDP growth rate, and thus it is not correlated with today's macro indicators. Table 9 repeats the most stringent specification, with fixed effects, for smaller US banks and each major loan category, using the IV formulation. 15 Our IV results confirm the presence of the bank lending and bank balance sheet channels for total lending and all the core lending categories except CRE. The findings are consistent in magnitude and statistical significance with the main outcomes we described earlier, suggesting that our benchmark findings are robust to correcting for potential endogeneity bias. The last five columns of Table 9 repeats the IV regressions testing the bank balance sheet channel, now including all banks and weighing each observation by the bank's market share in each lending segment. The relevant coefficients have the expected signs but are not statistically significant, except for RRE lending. The bank balance sheet channel has only been present in this lending category, and has operated largely during periods of low output growth.
We also extend our analysis to the crisis/post-crisis period of 2008-2016. Earlier papers established the substantial reduction in banks' loan supply following the large crisis-induced reduction in the availability of liquid funding to banks (Altunbas et al, 2011; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012) . Importantly, in this exercise our goal is to examine the crisis effect on the relationship between monetary policy and bank lending, rather than studying the direct lending effect of the crisis which these earlier papers focused on.
In Table 10 , we repeat the most complete specifications for each loan type from Tables 2   through 8 
Robustness
Using monetary policy forecast errors
In Table 1A , we repeat our benchmark specifications, now using the Romer and Romer monetary policy forecast residuals as our monetary policy measures (as updated by Wieland and Yang, 2015) in place of the quarterly change in the fed funds rate. In these estimations (which are select specifications from Tables 2 through 8) we continue to find evidence of the bank lending channel in smaller banks' lending: the simple and double interactions in specifications using the SEC ratio are significantly positive and negative, respectively. However, we do not find consistent evidence of the balance sheet channel using the Romer residuals as our measures of monetary policy (Columns 6 through 15).
Bank credit channel in an underperforming economy -When GDP growth is below trend
In Table 2A , we examine the bank credit channel when the US economy is operating "below trend"
-that is, when the output gap (as defined by the Congressional Budget Office, or CBO) is below zero. 16 Regarding the bank lending channel (Columns 1 through 5), results suggests that this channel operates stronger when the economy is under-performing. This finding is in line with the literature which shows that the funding cost-alleviating role of banks' net worth is particularly expressed when economic activity is low (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999) . Regarding the bank balance sheet channel, this channel also operates stronger through smaller banks' lending when economic activity is weak (Columns 6 through 10) -however, in weighted estimations such ranking is not consistently observable (Columns 11 through 15). This finding is in line with the implications from our benchmark results: the bank balance sheet channel is more cyclical in the lending of smaller US banks.
Asymmetries: Bank credit channel during monetary policy tightening vs. easing
Another interesting question to examine is the extent to which there may be asymmetries in the operation of the bank credit channel, depending on whether the Federal Reserve is tightening or easing monetary policy. Kishan and Opiela (2000) has established evidence of such asymmetries 16 The CBO calculates GDP growth trend, and therefore GDP gaps, over the 1949-2017 period. As result of using a different "reference period", there are notably higher number of "below trend" observations during our 1986-2008 period than "above trend". However, we believe that using the CBO's longer reference period is more representative than calculating the GDP growth trend over our sample.
during the first part of our sample, for both the bank lending and bank balance sheet channels. In addition to expanding the study of such asymmetries through 2008, more importantly we also examine how asymmetries may be related to real economic conditions.
In Table 3A , we repeat the most complete specifications (including bank and time fixed effects) from Tables 2 through 4 . We now separately examine our results during quarters of monetary policy easing (that is, when the cumulative change in the fed funds rate over the preceding four quarters is negative, in Columns 1 through 5) and monetary policy tightening (when the cumulative change in the fed funds rate is positive, in Columns 6 through 10). Similarly, in Tables 4A and 5A we repeat the most complete specifications from Tables 2, 5 These results show that the cyclicality of the bank lending channel (Table 3A, second row) is somewhat more detectable during periods of monetary policy easing. Similarly, Table 4A shows that the bank balance sheet channel is substantially stronger during periods of monetary policy easing (Columns 1 through 5). Such ranking is less clear when looking at the bank balance sheet channel in weighted estimations (Table 5A ). The general policy implication of these asymmetries is that during periods of low economic growth, expansionary monetary policy's operation through the bank credit channel through smaller banks' lending is especially potent.
Bank credit channel and the business cycle
In additional estimations (available from the authors upon request), we also examine the strength of the bank credit channel at various points along the business cycle. We do so by replacing real GDP growth with the CBO output gap in Equation (1) -thus, now studying both "above trend"
and "below trend" periods. These results confirm our earlier evidence that the bank credit channel is counter-cyclical -however, there are notable differences across sectors in this cyclicality.
Bank credit channel and the business cycle -Using monetary policy forecast errors
We also re-examine the relationship between the bank credit channel and the business cycle, now using monetary policy forecast errors as our monetary policy measure. Specifically, we repeat our benchmark specifications using the CBO's output gap as measures of the business cycle, and we also replace the quarterly change in the fed funds rate with the Romer and Romer monetary policy forecast residuals. Doing so, we strongly confirm our benchmark results that (1) the bank credit channel operates strongly, and (2) the bank credit channel is counter-cyclical (that is, particularly strong when economic activity is weak).
Bank balance sheet channel of monetary policy in "smaller" banks' lending
In our analysis, we focused on the subset of smaller banks to examine the bank lending channel and bank balance sheet channels of monetary policy. We then proceeded to conduct weighted estimations to study the bank balance sheet channel in all banks' lending. In our benchmark hypotheses and results we did not focus on the bank lending channel in all bank's lending, because the work of Kashyap and Stein (2000) suggests such channel operates only in the lending of the (more funding access-constrained) smaller banks. However, for completeness in additional specifications we also carry out these estimations, and as expected, do not find evidence of the bank lending channel in weighted estimations on all banks' lending.
Conclusions
We study the bank credit channel of monetary transmission in U.S. commercial banks' lending flows. We find that monetary policy is more effective through the bank credit channel when it is trying to spur growth during periods of low growth, rather than in trying to moderate economic activity in periods of high growth. Our results are fourfold: first, we provide evidence of the bank lending channel in various types of lending by smaller U.S. banks from 1986 to 2008, and we show that this channel is significantly stronger in times of low economic growth. Second, we show that the bank balance sheet channel is also present in these banks' lending flows, and it is also stronger in a low growth environment. Third, when we consider all U.S. commercial banks' weighted lending flows, we find strong evidence of the bank balance sheet channel. Fourth, we do not detect a bank credit channel post-2007.
In understanding the behavior of the macro economy, it is critical to understand the channels through which monetary policy operates. Our estimates, based on historical analysis, may provide insight into the strength of the bank credit channel in the coming years.
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[ Note: The table above shows the impact of U.S. monetary policy on U.S. banks' total lending, between 1986 and 2008. The dependent variable is the quarterly change in the natural logarithm of each bank's stock of total loans. Columns 1 through 8 shows results for the lending of "small" banks, where "small" indicates a bank whose total asset size is below the 95th percentile of the cross-sectional size distribution of all U.S. banks in a given quarter. "Ratio" indicates the securities to assets ratio in Columns 1 through 4, and the Leverage Ratio in Columns 5 through 12. The coefficients show the cumulative effect (over the preceding four quarters) of a one unit change in the explanatory variable (as listed in the leftmost column) on percentage point changes in lending flows (as indicated at the top of each column). Variable definitions and summary statistics are shown in Table 1 
Interaction of changes in the federal funds rate with the securities to assets or leverage ratio, cumulative over four quarters, at the 10th percentile of GDP growth
Interaction of changes in the federal funds rate with the securities to assets or leverage ratio, cumulative over four quarters, at the 90th percentile of GDP growth
Commercial & Industrial
Note: The table above shows the impact of U.S. monetary policy on U.S. banks' business (C&I and CRE) lending, between 1986 and 2008. The dependent variable is the quarterly change in the natural logarithm of each "small" bank's stock of C&I (Columns 1 through 4) and CRE (Columns 5 through 8) loans, where "small" indicates a bank whose total asset size is below the 95th percentile of the cross-sectional size distribution of all U.S. banks in a given quarter. The coefficients show the cumulative effect (over the preceding four quarters) of a one unit change in the explanatory variable (as listed in the leftmost column) on percentage point changes in lending flows (as indicated at the top of each column). Variable definitions and summary statistics are shown in Table 1 . Standard errors, clustered at the bank level, are shown below the coefficients. Stars indicate the significance of the coefficients: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. between 1986 and 2008 . The dependent variable is the quarterly change in the natural logarithm of each "small" bank's stock of residential real estate (Columns 1 through 4) and consumer (Columns 5 through 8) loans, where "small" indicates a bank whose total asset size is below the 95th percentile of the cross-sectional size distribution of all U.S. banks in a given quarter. The coefficients show the cumulative effect (over the preceding four quarters) of a one unit change in the explanatory variable (as listed in the leftmost column) on percentage point changes in lending flows (as indicated at the top of each column). Variable definitions and summary statistics are shown in Table 1 . Standard errors, clustered at the bank level, are shown below the coefficients. Stars indicate the significance of the coefficients: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Note: The table above shows the impact of U.S. monetary policy on U.S. banks' business (C&I and CRE) lending, between 1986 and 2008. The dependent variable is the quarterly change in the natural logarithm of each "small" bank's stock of C&I (Columns 1 through 4) and CRE (Columns 5 through 8) loans, where "small" indicates a bank whose total asset size is below the 95th percentile of the cross-sectional size distribution of all U.S. banks in a given quarte. The coefficients show the cumulative effect (over the preceding four quarters) of a one unit change in the explanatory variable (as listed in the leftmost column) on percentage point changes in lending flows (as indicated at the top of each column). Variable definitions and summary statistics are shown in Table 1 . Standard errors, clustered at the bank level, are shown below the coefficients. Stars indicate the significance of the coefficients: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Consumer p y p y ( ) g, p the quarterly change in the natural logarithm of each "small" bank's stock of residential (Columns 1 through 4) and consumer (Columns 5 through 8) loans, where "small" indicates a bank whose total asset size is below the 95th percentile of the cross-sectional size distribution of all U.S. banks in a given quarter. The coefficients show the cumulative effect (over the preceding four quarters) of a one unit change in the explanatory variable (as listed in the leftmost column) on percentage point changes in lending flows (as indicated at the top of each column). Variable definitions and summary statistics are shown in Table 1 . Standard errors, clustered at the bank level, are shown below the coefficients. Stars indicate the significance of the coefficients: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Note: The table above shows the impact of U.S. monetary policy on U.S. banks' business (C&I and CRE) lending, between 1986 and 2008. The dependent variable is the quarterly change in the natural logarithm of each bank's stock of C&I (Columns 1 through 4) and CRE (Columns 5 through 8) loans. Each observation is weighted by the given bank's share in the total market segment. The coefficients show the cumulative effect (over the preceding four quarters) of a one unit change in the explanatory variable (as listed in the leftmost column) on percentage point changes in lending flows (as indicated at the top of each column). Variable definitions and summary statistics are shown in Table 1 . Standard errors, clustered at the bank level, are shown below the coefficients. Stars indicate the significance of the coefficients: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Interaction of changes in the federal funds rate with the leverage ratio, cumulative over four quarters, at the 10th percentile of GDP growth
Interaction of changes in the federal funds rate with the leverage ratio, cumulative over four quarters, at the 90th percentile of GDP growth
Quarterly 
Consumer Consumer
Note: The table above shows the impact of U.S. monetary policy on U.S. banks' household (residential real estate and consumer) lending, between 1986 and 2008. The dependent variable is the quarterly change in the natural logarithm of each bank's stock of RRE (Columns 1 through 4) and consumer (Columns 5 through 8) loans. Each observation is weighted by the given bank's share in the total market segment. The coefficients show the cumulative effect (over the preceding four quarters) of a one unit change in the explanatory variable (as listed in the leftmost column) on percentage point changes in lending flows (as indicated at the top of each column). Variable definitions and summary statistics are shown in Table 1 . Standard errors, clustered at the bank level, are shown below the coefficients. Stars indicate the significance of the coefficients: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Interaction of changes in the federal
